Kristina Brecko
I am an empirical researcher studying core marketing questions and their intersection with public policy, with work spanning traditional domains as well as those with broad societal impact, such as sustainability and access to food and medication. Across these settings, I examine how firms’ pricing, branding, and advertising decisions interact with consumer trade-offs to influence both market performance and social outcomes. Methodologically, I draw on tools from empirical industrial organization, experimental and quasi-experimental methods, and economic theory, integrating modeling with empirical analysis when appropriate.
Curriculum VitaeIn this paper, we examine differentiation in grocery retail pricing strategies, focusing on their appeal to diverse consumer segments and their implications for the most constrained consumers. Our findings reveal that the grocery industry is highly fragmented, with distinct pricing strategies tailored to varying consumer needs and budget constraints, supported by concurrent investment strategies determining assortment and store location. We show that lower-income households predominantly shop at retailers offering lower and more stable prices, while higher-income households with greater budget flexibility gravitate toward retailers that provide quantity discounts and deeper intertemporal price promotions. These choices cannot be fully attributed to differences in assortment preferences or travel constraints; rather, they are shaped by binding budget constraints, as reflected in the savings consumers forgo when shopping at different retailers. Finally, we demonstrate that retailers' costly commitment to distinct pricing strategies creates healthful assortment trade-offs for the most budget constrained households and discuss implications for policy design.
Using large-scale data from 10 U.S. personal care categories from 2012 to 2019, we study firms' strategic differentiation in sustainability in the absence of regulation. Descriptive analysis shows that smaller brands supply the majority of sustainable products (86%) often with price premia, whereas dominant brands offer fewer, cheaper alternatives that focus exclusively on sustainable packaging. Structural estimates indicate that (i) average consumers place a low priority on sustainability relative to other product attributes, limiting dominant brands' incentives for broad adoption of sustainability; (ii) demand for sustainability features varies systematically with providing brands, creating differentiation opportunities for fringe brands; and (iii) sustainability features entail heterogeneous marginal costs, consistent with large brands specializing in sustainable packaging where they hold cost advantages. Collectively, these forces explain the observed differences in sustainability as part of brands' broader differentiation strategies. We discuss implications for firms and policymakers.
This paper extends the canonical harm reduction approach to a wider set of applications, including conservation. We develop an economic model to illustrate the trade-offs inherent to harm reduction, weighing the benefits of reducing harm against the risk of drawing those previously abstaining into consumption, and identify contexts where it is not applicable. Using sequential campaigns with embedded experimentation that enables measurement, we market a harm reduction solution in the context of water conservation. We show that a smart irrigation controller that efficiently maintains stigmatized ornamental landscapes appeals to the heaviest irrigators and generates large and long-lasting individual and social benefits: cost recovery in six months and water savings covering another household's basic needs. We find no evidence it cannibalizes abstinence (lawn removal) or increases irrigation by conservation-prone individuals. Our conceptual and measurement framework provides a foundation for implementing and evaluating harm reduction well beyond the typical drug and public health contexts.
In many durable good contexts, firms have the opportunity to price discriminate on quality by charging higher prices for the latest functionality. In the software good market, on the other hand, we often do not observe price discrimination on the latest versions, despite new versions being introduced over time. I propose that the software firm's ability to price discriminate on latest functionality is restricted by two factors: (1) the extent to which consumers value the innovation from one version to the next and (2) the extent to which legacy software products are costly for the firm to maintain. To analyze this question, I use a unique dataset on individual consumer subscriptions to a Fortune 500 firm's software products. The firm releases new product versions each year, but allows consumers to adopt the latest functionality for free. Despite this policy, descriptive analysis reveals that consumers frequently choose not to upgrade, electing to renew legacy versions of the product instead. To distinguish between the different factors driving this pattern, I develop a dynamic model of consumer choice of different product versions, renewal opportunities and upgrades. This model allows me to separately account for version usage utility, non-monetary costs of purchasing and upgrading and the heterogeneity therein. The estimates of the model reveal that although the majority of the consumers value the new versions, the high value, price insensitive consumers do not, causing it to be unprofitable for the firm to price latest functionality at a premium. Using the estimates and the structure of the model, I further describe a counterfactual that allows me to quantify how much a firm must innovate in order to be able to price new functionality at a premium when legacy versions are costly. The final counterfactual allows me to calculate the minimum legacy version cost that would cause the firm to shift from releasing distinct intertemporal versions to maintaining one continuously upgraded version of the product.
Introduction to marketing for students in the full-time MBA program.
